Hey, everybody,
I’m Dan Mcclellan. I’m a scholar of the Bible and religion.
Let’s get to the final part of my final engagement
with inspiring philosophy.
The argument can provide no data
that demonstrate that all prophecies are conditional
unless they explicitly say
this cannot be revoked. But we do give evidence,
like appealing to the narrative aspects of the book of Jonah,
like I did earlier in this video.
So, as I pointed out in part 1,
this is a misreading of the book of Jonah
that entirely undercuts the narrative tension
that the author is trying to build.
It will not be resolved until the great reveal
at the beginning of the final chapter of the book.
But this is a necessary misreading
because the interpretive lens that is being imposed upon Jonah
is not concerned for understanding
what the author wanted to achieve with their text.
The interpretive lens is
this prophecy needs to be understood as conditional.
How can we negotiate with the text
to arrive at the notion
that this prophecy was supposed to be understood as conditional?
But that’s a minority view.
That’s not the consensus view.
The consensus view is precisely what I explained,
that this builds narrative tension
because the author is not explaining
why Jonah would not be excited
to go preach destruction to the Ninevites.
And just so you know, I’m not making this up.
Here’s the Hermanus commentary volume on Jonah from last year
by Susan Knight, page 35.
Jonah’s reaction is to run away and refuse his charge
without explanation. When the prophet Elijah flees to the mountain,
it is to escape Jezebel who seeks his life,
but the reader has no idea why Jonah seeks to escape his charge.
In this way, the opening verses set up a major problematic of the book
and encourage the reader to learn more about this odd protagonist
and his motivations. And then,
if we look at the footnote,
Robin Payne describes Jonah as a type of anti prophet.
Meyer
Sternberg treats Jonah’s unexplained reaction to the divine command
as exemplifying a surprise gap that controls the reader’s progress
over a whole book. There is a consensus view of the rhetorical goals
of the author of the book of Jonah,
and it has to do with building narrative tension
we don’t know why Jonah is not preaching destruction to the Ninivites
until it is revealed that Jonah knew god would change their mind.
Or appealing to the fact that in Jesus’s ministry
he gave conditions that need to be met
and even spoke about the possibility of a delay.
And as I pointed out previously,
these were all conditions that scholars agree
the authors of these texts expected to be met
within the time frame they set for the Perushia.
Or we could appeal to places like Daniel 4,
where Nebuchadnezzar is given
what seems like an unconditional prophecy
in a dream, but then Daniel tells him to break off
Your sins by practicing righteousness,
and your iniquities by showing mercy to the oppressed.
That there may perhaps be a lengthening of your prosperity.
Even though it’s not stated,
Daniel just assumes the prophecy can be changed
if Nebuchadnezzar repents.
So this is still inadequate evidence,
and for at least three different reasons.
1. The verse you quoted says
that there may perhaps be a lengthening of your prosperity.
This is not Daniel saying, hey,
didn’t you hear the conditions that were attached?
Just meet the conditions and you’ll be fine.
This is Daniel recognizing that there are no conditions,
but saying, hey,
repent anyway, and maybe god will change their mind.
It’s the exact same thing that the king of Nineveh does,
only here Nebuchadnezzar doesn’t do it.
And all of these things happen to Nebuchadnezzar anyway.
And that brings up the second thing.
It was unconditional because god knew it was going to happen,
and it happened. So just pointing out that Daniel says, hey,
maybe god will change their mind if you do all these things,
doesn’t change the fact that this is an unconditional prophecy
that still comes to pass according to the narrative.
And this brings up the third thing.
When you look at all of the prophecies
to which you appeal as evidence that prophecies can be conditional,
even when no conditions are stated,
they all share something in common.
It is god saying, I’m going to destroy you,
and then the people repenting.
And then god forgiving them and not destroying them.
So there is a specific type of prophecy
regarding which god is more likely to change their mind.
And it is specifically prophecies about destruction that are averted
because the targets of the destruction repent of their wickedness.
These are not the defining features of the Olivet discourse
and the prophecy of the Perusia.
So
the notion that we can transpose the presupposition of conditionality
from that specific type of prophecy
onto an entirely different type of prophecy
is additionally problematized.
And so we keep seeing this cultural norm
that most prophecies were understood as conditional.
But you’ve not demonstrated any such norm.
As I pointed out, you are assuming that that is the norm,
and then you are inferring
that this is how most prophecies would have functioned.
Based on that Assumption. You have not remotely made an adequate case
for any audience that is not already committed to the list of dogmas
that Hays at all lay out in their book.
And you’re doing it precisely to resolve a dogmatic problem.
You’re doing precisely what I said you’re doing.
And regardless of motives,
this doesn’t show I’m wrong.
Merely talking about my motives does not address my argument.
I have fully addressed your argument and its inadequacies.
I have also addressed your motives
to explain why you feel convinced by your inadequate argument.
That is for the benefit of others,
to show them that apologetic arguments
are built on Dogmatic presuppositions
and cannot get around them.
And now we’re gonna move on to my invitation for you to clarify.
So I would like clarification.
Are you saying that your argument only works
provided everyone involved already accepts a list of Christian dogmas?
If that’s the case,
then your argument can’t function within a critical environment.
It can only function within a dogmatic environment.
If you’re making the case that this is a de jure argument
that requires presupposing a list of Christian dogmas,
please say so, and I will apologize,
and I will back out of this argument,
and I will be happy to be wrong.
So, in one sense, yes.
Because the critic says, if god is real,
how could he have uttered a false prophecy?
So to answer that objection,
we have to assume god actually did give the prophecy.
So two concerns here. The first
is that I don’t think you’ve articulated that question adequately.
Cause if a critic is saying,
if god is real, then how could he utter a false prophecy?
The presupposition is that the prophecy is false.
And the request is
that you demonstrate how a real god could utter a false prophecy.
That’s the situation
where they’re willing to give you the presupposition that god is real.
The request is prove that a real god can utter a false prophecy.
The request there is not demonstrate that the prophecy isn’t false.
If they were making that request,
it would be something More along the lines of,
show that this prophecy is true.
And I don’t think I’ve seen a critic make that request
while also saying,
I’m gonna allow you to presuppose a bunch of dogmas along the way.
So I don’t think that’s what the request was.
So that’s a big concern of mine.
Second concern is that if this argument is actually tailor made,
customized to a critic
who is offering to presuppose the existence of god,
then I want to see the argument that is not customized to that.
I want to see the argument that is for a critical environment
that is not going to give you any of those presuppositions.
I don’t think you have anything else to add.
I don’t think your argument would be any different,
because I think your apologetic
requires all of these dogmatic presuppositions.
But at the same time, I don’t think you want to acknowledge that.
Because if you did acknowledge that,
that would be acknowledging
that your argument does not work in a critical environment.
And as you’re about to argue,
you would like for your apologetics
to operate in a critical environment.
I really don’t think it can.
But I’m willing to give you one chance to prove me wrong.
But I don’t agree it cannot function in a critical environment.
And I also don’t agree there’s a clear distinction
between dogmatic and critical environments.
I reject the distinction. Your rejection is noted.
And also rejected. There’s a Very clear distinction,
and I’ll lay it out for you.
In a critical environment,
you don’t get away with presupposing traditional authorship.
You don’t get away with presupposing the unity of any given text.
You don’t get away with presupposing historicity or univocality,
or inerrancy, or inspiration,
or the existence of a supernatural agent behind the scenes
pulling the strings. You have to make a case for all of those things.
Now, in a dogmatic environment,
you mostly get away with presupposing those things.
And if anyone challenges those things,
the evidentiary bar that you must clear is phenomenally low.
In a critical environment,
you have a much higher evidentiary bar to get over.
Those things are not presupposed.
Now, obviously,
the response is going to be the standard
apologetic retreat to epistemological uncertainty
so that you can say, aha,
but critical scholars also have presuppositions.
Yes, critical scholars must presuppose certain things
to cover gaps in epistemological uncertainty
so that we can arrive at conclusions.
But
those are always based on theoretical and methodological frameworks
that are only provisionally accepted
unless and until an argument comes forth
that shows they are inadequate
or that there is a better theoretical or methodological framework.
That’s the difference. In a critical environment,
everything is open to scrutiny and to revision and to replacement.
In a dogmatic environment,
there is a list of things that are not open to scrutiny,
to revision or to replacement.
And that is why your argument cannot operate.
In a critical environment.
And so I’m not going to agree with the claim
that we’re just doing this to save dogma.
I think we do have good reasons and evidence
to suggest this is a plausible and parsimonious reading of the text.
So this is the standard apologetic approach.
And it’s another wonderful illustration of the distinction
between a critical environment
and a dogmatic environment.
Because in a critical environment,
scholars are primarily concerned
for identifying the most likely conclusion,
whatever that may be. In a dogmatic environment,
your conclusion is already presupposed.
And the job is to try to construct the most convincing argument
that that presupposed conclusion is not impossible,
or maybe even that it’s plausible.
That’s how it usually gets framed.
And this is why you will generally argue
that you have good reason to believe that something is plausible.
That always seems to be the line that you retreat to.
And I think it’s because you recognize that you’re not making the case
that your position is the most likely position.
You’re just trying to make the case to your audience
that their belief is not impossible.
Cause if you can gin up the tiniest little sliver of not impossible,
then everybody who already agrees with the presupposed conclusion
can feel justified in agreeing with it.
So even though this is presented to us as an internal critique,
we’re not just arguing this way to save dogma.
Yes, you are.
And a fit for this Video has been Dipper Pines